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ould seem of as great importance to scrutinize the reliability of norms 
applying, as that of one or another way of appIying them. Actually, 
er, a contrary procedure is more usual-for many will comply and 
insist upon the compliance of others, with particuIar norms of inference, 
valuation and action, stake principal hopes upon their soundness, and per- 
haps devote years of effort to their meticulous application, all with scarcely 
a serious effort to determine just how probable it may be that the fa- 
vored norms really warrant any such trust. There are some areas of interest 
within which this way of proceeding may arise from the implicit faith of 
believers in a divinely revealed sanction of certain norms. But elsewhere 
and more widely, doubtless it is accepted in preference to confronting dif- 
ficulties of critical inquiry on as fundamental a level as the justifying 
grounds of one's group's governing ideas and valuations, established aims, 
policies, and institutional systems. 
That many should feel such hesitancy is not strange-much as it is 
understandable that less experienced climbers are likely to feel uncomfort- 
able with the thought that they should continually watch their foothold. But 
it is surprising to find experts who appear oblivious to any such need. We 
must suppose the experienced investigator-for instance in a field of social 
interest such as economics, politics, or law-has other reasons than intel- 
lectual timidity for his reluctance to press his inquiries into basic norma- 
tive issues, toward their eventual untanglement. I t  might be expected that 
he would consider critically the norms he employs, from the standpoint of 
their adequacy to deal with more essential aspects of his subject matter- 
especially the distinctive aspects which uniquely differentiate the nature of 
its phenomena. In social inquiry, for example, wilI not the competent in- 
vestigator critically scrutinize his norms from the standpoint of their ade- 
quacy to treat the ground-assumptions of fact and valuation, whatever they 
may be, upon which a given society bases its whole structure of working 
familiar reply to suggestions that he do so, has taken the form of an 
1 to fact. Is it not the business of the scientist in social as we11 as 
other areas, to describe accurately what is-not to imagine or attempt to 
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judge what ought to be? How can anyone measure or verify a society's pre. 
vailing conceptions of what ought to be, or establish the real rightness 
of its principal norms when these are shaped in terms of some 
imaginatively projected ideal aims? Since it is the function of social norms 
to properly direct thinking and acting toward desirable future consequences, 
they must be based upon speculative estimates of the potentials of people 
and things. At a particular time, tests for the soundness of a norm virtuauy 
must amount to tests of reliability for whatever predictions of future con. 
sequences assuredly are to be anticipated from its use, In the case of social 
norms which involve valuations, expressive of varyingly desirable aspects to 
be experienced in the consequences, matters are further complicated by a 
need to weigh predictions in terms of what will prove generally pleasing or 
otherwise in the tumultuous world of human feelings and desires. In 
short, social norms implying valuations must be recognized as construe. 
tions shaped by human imagination to implement its ideal ends-norms 
seemingly well-adapted to perform their function of insuring satisfactions 
of needs in a near or more distant future-hence in a still only imaginative. 
ly constructed world. Is it strange that such normative creations should vary 
radically with times and localities? But is it not also clear that issues of real 
validity or of verification in the case of these diverse normative idealiza- 
tions that imagination projects as standard criteria for social behavior, must 
lie quite without the ambit of true scientific inquiry? It is of course unfor- 
tunate if this frequently leaves the treatment of powerful social sentiments 
chiefly to the sentamentalists, who may know little of what sound scientific 
thinking means-but we are asked, is it not the only course open to the 
responsible social scientist? 
Affirmative answers on the part of a good many social scientists have 
been supported in at 1mst two ways---one, by the familiar assertion that it 
is the function of true science to describe accurately and classify facts as 
they are found. It is not to interpret their significance or attempt their valu- 
ation in terms of human interests. Hence, critical problems of norms which 
involve questions of justifiable valuations, are not germane to social 
study which deserves to be called "scientific." Let inquiries that would be 
worthy of being valued and trusted by men as truly "scientific," sternly 
eschew all consideration of basic validity in social valuations, devoting them- 
selves instead wholeheartedIy to facts-especially those susceptible of ex- 
act objective observation and statistical tabulation. 
A second support for a radically factualist attitude has been found in a 
differing argument which sees no serious difficulty at all about the way to 
determine a society's proper valuational norms. It may indeed be the case 
that inquiry entirely faithful to scientific method in such fields as law, eco- 
nomics, and politics, cannot remain altogether oblivious to the validity of 
common norms of human significance and valuation. But these norms need 
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ody be tested by the plainly observable facts of relevant situations. Indeed, 
sound valuational norms are precisely those which have been derived from 
established facts-and not from any ideology or anyone's imagina- 
tive idealizations. 
Both of these ways of eocape for the social scientist from questions of 
justification-whether for social norms or those he himself em- 
ploys in treating social phenomena-are confronted by certain difficulties. 
One of these, and perhaps the most damaging, arises from the essential 
nature of the "facts" to which such arguments would ascribe finality. "Fact" 
is, of course, an ambiguous word, likely to be used one moment as a desig- 
nation for what is really the case-but the next as a name for what the 
speaker, or his group or age, on some ground deemed convincing, thinks 
is really the case. Taken as a synonym for "final reality," "facts" would be 
indubitably certain-if we could also certainly possess any of them. On 
the other hand, taken as interpretative constructions from material of em- 
pirical impressions and assumptions of coherent thought, and tested for re- 
liability by criteria that seem convincing in terms of the prevailing idea- 
system of a time and place, our "known facts" may be numerous, of in- 
dispensable worth, and often, in a11 probability, most reliable constructions 
-but never surely beyond possible need of future reconsideration and re- 
vision. Now either of these usages of the word might be well enough if 
adhered to consistently-the trouble comes when they are confused, mak- 
ing "fact" mean actual reality at one moment, and at the next what seems 
a reliable way of construing what is real. Surely no age has seen greater 
rations in the "plain" or "indubitable" facts of the past, than our own. 
is an elementary recognition that our experienced and known facts- 
h are the only ones we may well consider-in any literal sense, never 
are simply "given," or "found ready-made for the taking. All are, of 
course, conditioned by human modes of perception, shaped and defined in 
terms of prevailing systems of ideas, as well as verified by whatever criteria 
of truth and value such a system assumes and approves. Assuredly this does 
not mean that all constructions of fact are altogether factitious, or that all 
are to be dismissed in a spirit of dogmatic scepticism as equally unreliable. 
What it does indicate is that trust in any facts must be at root trust in the 
justifiability of the systematic grounds that have determined its specific 
formulation and acceptance. And these systematic grounds can only be such 
through normative requirements which demand that one construction rather 
than some other shall be accepted as actual "fact." Thus trust in facts, far 
from constituting a substitute for critical scrutiny of norms or appraisal of 
their reliability, necessarily turns out to be trust in the particular systematic 
norms apart from which no idea of these particular facts would exist in 
men's minds. Indeed, without some systematic norms for their formulation 
and acceptance, there would clearly be no notion of facts among human 
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beings, only manifold unorganized impressions-but then we would scarce. 
ly be human beings. 
My point is, that fact and norm are both essentially systematic terms, 
both are inseparably dependent within a people's total idea-system-both 
confront the social scientist who seeks any fundamental understanding of 
his subject matter with what are at root identical problems of verification, 
These pertain first, to whether a particular fact or norm adequately satis. 
fies what a system of ideas-scientific, religious, economic, political, legal, 
etc.-requires. But further, they pertain to whether requirements of the sys. 
tem rest upon normative assumptions that are actually justifiable. 
Within the whole prevailing idea-system of a time and place, all recog. 
nized facts are construed in terms of particular segmental systems of in- 
terest-all are facts within more or less specialized frames of reference, facts 
of one kind or another. So it happens that the "factual world" to which a 
science of economics, politics, or  law is germane, is quite a different one 
than the "factual worId" to which a science of chemistry, physics, or as- 
tronomy pertains. There may of course be much in common, but all con. 
strue their facts in systematic terms-which means with reference to dii- 
ferent, though obviously related, systems. The facts, as they are construed 
in terms of a particular system, bear characteristics of the system-and this, 
not merely as superficial aspects, but as essential characteristics without 
which they simply wouId not be the kind of facts they are. Thus, for ex- 
ample, beyond characteristics of a physical system, such as space-time re- 
lations, or motion and causality, biological facts possess essential charac- 
teristics of a recognized system of specifically organic relationships. They 
are not less real facts for this, however, and the biologist who sought to 
avoid consideration of aspects of his facts which were distinctively organic 
characteristics would not be serving science, but effacing his field of in- 
quiry. And sureIy it cannot be the demand of a truly scientific attitude that 
one ignore what is peculiar to the subject matter of his field, but, rather, 
that he seek adequate ways of dealing effectively with what may be unique 
to it. 
One distinctive characteristic of much of the factual subject matter with 
which an investigator must deal in any area of social inquiry is the presence 
of human motivation as a shaping cause of relationships, attitudes and ac- 
tivities. Irrespective of any hypothesis one may choose to hold regarding a 
"freedom of will" at the basis of motivation, it is clear that in no presently 
recognizable way can this motivation of men in society be systematized in 
any such regular order, for example, as that evident in chemical reactions. 
Thus, while the chemist may find norms for his judgments and choices 
(e.g., of hypotheses) that are implied in a rigidly regular system of rela- 
tions-imaginatively idealized as universal by his forerunners and subse- 
quently abundantly tested-successful norms for a social science cannot 
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I Lvefl be grounded in assumptions of any such predictably undeviating, or me- 
chanical, regularity. They must be established upon predictable agreements 
of a different kind, i.e., predictable motivating values. 
Understood in terms of the relations of a system which involves motiva- 
' tion, recognized facts acquire a new dimension as an intrinsic part of their 
nature. That is, they acquire future projections-the recognized facts be- 
coming what they are, to a large extent, by virtue of more or less desirable 
of future consequence. Bradley pointed out that we recognize 
2 thing as a factual reality, rather than illusion, through its continuing to 
be what it was-and nothing is more familiar than Bergson's brilliant work 
in showing the large place memory holds in establishing all factual knowl- 
edge. But some manner of imaginative construction of its near, if not dis- 
tant, future being and significance is similarly indispensable to every con- 
struction in thought and experience which we designate as "a fact." 
This future dimension in our known facts doubtless is due to their be- 
ing constituted both by the nature of what is known and our particular 
human way of knowing and taking interest in it. It  is characteristic of all 
living beings that their actions are somehow directed toward the future, 
though with simpler creatures presumably with no conscious purpose on 
their part. Higher animals frequently show measures of foresight. Human 
beings, however, possess a further degree of mentality-of which the crucial 
test, in William James's phrase, is a capacity to select future ends and 
choose means for their attainment. For man, as Cassirer said, "to think 
of the future and to live in the future, is a necessary part of his nature." 
Implied in this are human capacities for deliberate valuations. Man's life 
of thought and action-rather than of "torpid stuporv-is due to his shap- 
ing not merely some single image for the future, toward which he might 
then remain passive, but numerous and diverse images. Among these he 
may attempt value-judgments of more and less desirable. Thereafter he may 
direct his actions accordingly-earning the distinction of being an intelli- 
gent self-directing creature. Further, among the possible images is that 
which would be best for the future--one in terms of which other images 
are to be appraised relatively. True, there may be scant hope of achiev- 
ing this best state of affairs in its entirety at any foreseeable date. But 
it serves to provide a criterion by which to determine the relative merits 
of more easily accessible ends and courses of action. In short, it permits 
translation of preferred ideal-ends into working objectives, with mean- 
ings that pass beyond temporary requirements of prudence to more com- 
prehensive considerations of policy-and perhaps occasionally to impera- 
tives of wisdom. 
Norms are by nature guides-their claims of validity imply preferable 
future consequences for judgments, valuations and actions which 
comply with them. Difficulties in their verification by a scientific method 
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have been described in diverse ways which usually in the end come back 
to this-how can constructions of imagination, which are not 0bSe~abl~ 
facts at all in an objective sense, ever be scientifically verified? What 1 
have wished to suggest here is that the social scientist is faced by remark. 
ably similar and to a considerable extent the same difficulties, whether h, 
attempts to verify in any basic way, either the norms-political, legal, eco. 
nomic-that live in a people's dominant idea-system, or the constructions 
of fact which live in the system. Indeed, the factual constructions depend 
upon the normative assumptions in a system of thinking in terms of which 
they are effected. This does not mean that neither norms nor facts can 
be verified with a high degree of probability. But it does suggest that the 
impassable gulf frequently supposed to separate the soundly verifiable facts 
of a scientific social inquiry, from the gossamer-winged ideal norms fasb. 
ioned by a society's imagination, is itself one of the more unfortunate 
products of imagination. But why should imagination, in its saner ma& 
festations, be equated with mere fancy or wishful thinking? Has it not been 
responsible for every major advance since the Stone Age-each in turn 
proceeding through imaginative insight-in the case of social attitudes and 
institutional life, insight which revised or displaced old vaIuationa1 norms 
for new, For whatever we may think of it, we may hardly deny that our 
civilization, as Professor Tsanoff has observed, "is what it is and where it 
is because of our choice and scale of values." 
There is slight room for question that it must always be so. The perti- 
nent question is why society should be deprived by the social scientist of 
a penetrating examination of the norms it lives by, from those who possess 
competent skill and experience in critical investigation. It was an error of 
the seventeenth century, that it tended to equate the meaning of "scien- 
tific spirit" with the use of a specific and limited methodology-useful in 
some areas, but absurd in the borrowed applications of "social physics." 
Is it not the essence of scientific wisdom that everywhere method follows 
the requirements for sound and adequate understanding? It is not the func- 
tion of a method of inquiry to determine what is to be examined or ne- 
glected in the basic nature of its subject matter, but to provide a compe- 
tent means of examination for whatever of consequence is present to be 
explored. Scientific method has seen many revisions and enlargements to 
achieve effective competence in distinctive fields. Why should the social 
scientist remain timid or unimaginative in developing fundamental adapta- 
tions which will enable him to deal cogently and critically with normative 
issues of his phenomena--even to the basic vdue-assumptions from which 
they come? 
